A justice-orientated ‘liberal inclusivism’; Mirza Qummi on the soteriological implications of false belief in matters of fundamental doctrine

The vast majority of scholars of Islamic legal theory, from across thediversity of denominational schools and affiliations, have held that the correctunderstanding (muṣīb) in matters of fundamental doctrinal beliefs (uṣūl aldīn) can be only one. Views of legal theorists regarding the status of those notattaining such correct understanding, be they Muslim or non-Muslim, areimportant elements in Islamic soteriology regarding ‘the other’ as well asholding implications for intra and inter faith dynamics within this life. Thispaper will examine the views of 18thcentury Shī ͑ ī scholar Mirza Abu alQasim Qummi and his apparent efforts to endorse, justify and even extend theopinion attributed to the 3rdcentury Amr ibn Bahr al-Jahiz. Although MirzaQummi does not deny that ‘the correct’ position in matters of fundamentaldoctrine is only one, he does argue against considering one who is incorrect assinful (āthim), subject to divine retribution (mu‘adhdhab) and an unbeliever(kāfir) if their false doctrinal understanding is not out of of obstinacy in theface of disclosed truth nor resulting from any willful negligence in efforts tounderstand the truth. Mirza Qummi’s position, which engages with the typicalarguments cited in the debate, can be seen as an implication of some of hisown landmark epistemic and theological presuppositions. The case of MirzaQummi will demonstrate that Islamic soteriological inclusivism can movebeyond what Khalil describes as ‘limited’ to ‘liberal’ not only throughreference to Muslim visions of God’s Mercy but also in light of His Justice.

کلیدواژه ها:

Liberal inclusivism ، Mirza Qummi ، Amr ibn Bahr al-Jahiz ، Islamic soteriology