Corporate Governance, Internationalization and Tax Avoidance: A Robust Panel Data Analysis with Moderation Effects

This study investigates the relationship between internationalization, corporate tax avoidance, and board independence using a robust panel data approach. Drawing on agency theory, the study examines whether firms with higher international exposure engage more in tax avoidance activities, and whether board independence mitigates this relationship. The empirical analysis is based on firm-level data from an emerging market context. The results indicate that internationalization has a significant positive effect on tax avoidance, while board independence has a negative moderating effect. Robustness checks, including fixed effects estimation, multicollinearity diagnostics (VIF), and alternative model specifications, confirm the stability of the findings. These results provide strong empirical evidence supporting agency theory in explaining corporate tax behavior in emerging economies.

کلیدواژه ها:

Tax Avoidance ، Internationalization ، Corporate Governance ، Board Independence ، Panel Data ، Agency Theory