Improvement of Two Distance Bounding Protocols Against Terrorist and Force Attacks

Widespread deployment of wireless systems that use the locationpositioning and physical proximity to provide services leads to theemergence of many technologies based on radio frequency. Today,these systems are used in a wide range of applications includingtracking of people and assets, emergency and rescue support andaccess control. One of these technologies is radio frequencyidentification (RFID). Since the spread of wireless technologies needsto enhance safety and security, so reliability of location estimates andthe data used in these systems is necessary. One of the location attacksthat can threaten a RFID system is distance fraud attack in whichadversary is a tag itself that tries to show its distance from reader lessthan what it is. Mafia fraud in which the attack takes place withoutthe knowledge of tag and reader. The main attack is terrorist fraudattack in which the frauder tag cooperates with adversary. Distancebounding protocols have been proposed to deal with these attackswhich are a family of authentication protocols based on challenge andresponse, and the round-trip time of signals is measured in them andthe physical distance between the tag and reader will be determinedbased on this time. In this paper, we investigate terrorist fraud attack on two distance bounding protocol schemes, first TMA protocol andthen BSB protocol. Then we will continue to improve schemes. Weprove that our scheme is resistant against the carried out attacks basedon formal models.