THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRM PERFORMANCE, REWARD OF EXECUTIVE MANAGERS AND FLUCTUATIONS OF INVESTMENT VOLUME IN THE FIRMS LISTED ON TSE

سال انتشار: 1395
نوع سند: مقاله کنفرانسی
زبان: انگلیسی
مشاهده: 301

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شناسه ملی سند علمی:

ICOEM01_180

تاریخ نمایه سازی: 25 آذر 1395

چکیده مقاله:

The present study aimed to evaluate the relationship between firm performance, reward ofexecutive managers and fluctuations of investment volume in the firms listed on TSE. This studyis library, analytical-causal and based on panel data analysis. In this study, financial informationof 109 firms listed on TSE during 2008 to 2013 (654 firms-year). SPSS 20, Eviews 7 andMinitab 16 software are used for data analysis. The results of study regarding the support of firstmain hypothesis showed that in case of fixation of other factors, the firms with high liabilityratio, their capital structure is based on the selection of ROA –based reward payment to ROEbasedreward payment. Based on the analyses, regarding the support of second main hypothesis,we found that in case of fixation of other factors, the firms with high liability ratio, their capitalstructure can select ROE-based reward payment against reward payment based on ROA –basedreward payment.

کلیدواژه ها:

Managers reward ، Return on asset and panel data ، Stock return rate

نویسندگان

Ehsan Rakei

Master of accounting, Department of Management & Accounting in Islamic Azad University, South Tehran Branch, Tehran, Iran

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