The Type of Moral Law as Schema in Kant, and Fantasy in Lacan

Kant's critical philosophy is a coherent whole of theoretical and practical reason. Such a totality includes active and plural elements that connect the components of this totality to each other, in such a way that they finally meet in practical reason. In this sense, practical reason is the foundation of theoretical reason, in other words, free action encompasses the whole of this philosophy. To begin with, we consider theoretical reason. Experience in theoretical reason becomes possible in the field of phenomena and through causality, and connects The external, i.e., the external world, to The internal (understanding). But something has to mediate this link. Schema establishes such a link between the outside and the inside. In practical reason, the empirical world and the will are on both sides of this mediator. But the case is different from theoretical reason because freedom is a nominal thing that is represented in a different way from theoretical reason. So, a kind of representation is needed, different from causal representation. For this purpose, Kant chooses the type of the moral law for such a representation. model of moral law plays the same role as Schema in theoretical reason. Corresponding to this concept in Lacan's psychoanalysis is the concept of fantasy. Just as Schemah determines the coordinates of nature and will in theoretical and practical reason, fantasy also draws such coordinates in relation to desire. The type of the moral law in Kant, similar to fantasy, determines the coordinates of the subject's action, and this primary fantasy determines the subject's action. In this approach, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God act as a secondary fantasy.

کلیدواژه ها:

Kant ، Lacan ، Schema ، Fantasy ، Moral Law