From “Naval Siege of Iran” to a Gamble over Hormuz: Anatomy of a Multipolar Crisis

By Mohammad Hassan Sangtarash

The recent directive by Donald Trump calling for a “naval siege of Iran” and the seizure of any vessel paying dues to Tehran is less a campaign flourish than an entry into the perilous domain of quasi-blockade. It targets the most sensitive energy chokepoint on earth. Yet a technical and strategic unpacking of this proposition reveals that geography, international law, and political economy impose hard constraints on this geopolitical gamble.

1. Lawfare at Sea: “Transit Passage” vs. “Innocent Passage”

A frequently overlooked dimension is Iran’s effort to reshape the governing legal order of the strait. Tehran seeks to displace the regime of Freedom of Navigation with a model of cost-imposing coastal sovereignty—one in which passage is not an absolute right, but a regulated privilege.

Technically, Iran leverages its non-adherence to aspects of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to privilege Innocent Passage over Transit Passage. This legal repositioning enables Tehran to define “harm” through its own security parameters, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the United States Fifth Fleet presence and casting military transit as a disturbance of coastal order. In effect, Trump’s blockade rhetoric plays on a field where Iran has already instrumentalized law—commercializing and securitizing the very cost of foreign presence.

2. The Operational Environment: Entering the A2/AD Trap

Any U.S. naval approach to the Strait of Hormuz entails entry into a dense A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) environment. In a corridor roughly 33 kilometers wide, the technological superiority of large surface combatants is blunted by Iran’s geographic advantage.

Iran’s doctrine is rooted in asymmetric warfare: layered shore-to-sea missile saturation, swarm tactics, and intelligent mining. In such a battlespace, capital ships—particularly aircraft carriers—risk transitioning from hunters to high-value, vulnerable targets. Hormuz is not an open-ocean theater; it is a compressed kill chain where geography acts as a force multiplier.

3. The Resilience Paradox: Allies on the Brink

A critical miscalculation in blockade scenarios is the neglect of allied resilience thresholds. The Arab states of the Persian Gulf occupy a paradoxical position. While Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have partially diversified export routes via pipelines (e.g., East–West to the Red Sea, Habshan–Fujairah), others—such as Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain—remain fully dependent on Hormuz.

Beyond hydrocarbons, these economies are acutely vulnerable in food and goods security. With 80–90% reliance on maritime imports, any disruption would trigger artificial scarcity, insurance spikes, and immediate socio-economic stress in hubs like Dubai, Doha, and Kuwait City. These actors are therefore more likely to become the first pressure points against Washington’s escalation, seeking to avert systemic destabilization.

4. Political Economy of Crisis: Structural Shock and Oil Prices

The Strait of Hormuz carries roughly 20% of global oil supply. Its disruption is not a pressure point on Iran alone—it constitutes a form of systemic economic self-harm for the international order.

A blockade scenario could propel oil prices into the $150–$200 range, generating a structural supply shock and unprecedented imported inflation across major economies, including the United States itself. Even a “voluntary avoidance” scenario—where shipping reroutes due to war risk—would dramatically inflate transport costs and paralyze global supply chains.

5. Multipolar Escalation and the “Multi-Chokepoint War”

The greatest dependence on Hormuz lies with Asian economies—most notably China, India, and Japan. Any U.S. interdiction or seizure of vessels in international waters risks approaching the legal threshold of state piracy, potentially provoking direct friction with emerging powers.

Simultaneously, the likelihood of a multi-chokepoint conflict is high. Should Hormuz be obstructed, Iran’s strategic reach toward Bab el-Mandeb could extend the battlespace from the Suez Canal to the Indian Ocean. The result would be a contiguous maritime conflict zone—effectively paralyzing East–West trade.

Strategic Conclusion

Trump’s rhetoric should be interpreted within the framework of Hybrid Warfare, aimed at psychological deterrence rather than immediate execution. On-the-ground realities suggest that a “naval siege of Iran” is not a short-term tactical maneuver but a high-cost geopolitical wager on the world’s primary energy artery.

Any attempt at full enforcement would amount to the onset of a direct and expansive naval war—one that no single power could sustainably contain. The pattern aligns with Trump’s recurring use of the “madman strategy”: amplifying perceived capability while denigrating the adversary to extract political concessions.

Yet the Strait of Hormuz is not governed by rhetoric—it is governed by the balance of power across coastlines and sea lanes. In this lethal chessboard, Iran may not be able to close the strait indefinitely, but it retains the capacity to transform it into an operational hellscape—functionally unusable for any would-be aggressor.