Canal Salman: A Failed Saudi Geopolitical Gamble and the Consolidation of the Hormuz–Bab al-Mandeb Axis

By Mohammad Hassan Sangtarash

The proposed “Canal Salman” (often referred to as the “Arab Canal”) should be understood not merely as an infrastructure megaproject, but as a geopolitical attempt to reconfigure the energy and security architecture of the Middle East. Designed to stretch roughly 950 kilometers across eastern Saudi Arabia toward Yemen’s al-Mahra province—with potential extensions leveraging Oman’s geography—the project aimed to create an alternative corridor to the Indian Ocean and ultimately reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz.

At the strategic level, Canal Salman was embedded in a broader doctrine of geopolitical diversification of energy routes, intended to neutralize Iran’s leverage over maritime chokepoints. By rerouting a portion of Gulf energy exports away from Hormuz, Saudi Arabia sought not only to mitigate risk exposure but also to reshape the regional balance of maritime power.

However, this strategic architecture rested on a critical assumption: geopolitical stability and alignment in southern Arabia. The evolution of the Yemeni conflict—particularly the consolidation of Ansarallah—fundamentally undermined this premise.

Ansarallah’s growing influence along Yemen’s western corridors and its proximity to the Red Sea effectively transformed the Bab al-Mandeb from a passive transit point into an active geopolitical lever. This shift altered maritime security calculations and introduced a new layer of risk for any energy infrastructure project dependent on southern exit routes.

More importantly, the alignment—direct or indirect—between Ansarallah and Iran has contributed to the emergence of a dual-chokepoint dynamic. In this configuration, both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb are no longer isolated vulnerabilities but interconnected nodes within a broader strategic environment shaped by asymmetric actors and regional competition.

Within this context, Canal Salman encountered a structural contradiction: a project designed to bypass Hormuz became strategically constrained by the very chokepoint dynamics it sought to escape. The absence of a secure and politically reliable outlet in Yemen rendered the project not only impractical but strategically obsolete.

In effect, Canal Salman represents a geopolitical failure for Saudi Arabia—not simply because it was not realized, but because the conditions required for its success have been fundamentally eroded. Rather than diminishing the relevance of Hormuz, regional developments have reinforced a dual dependency on both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb.

This case underscores a broader lesson in contemporary geopolitics: infrastructure alone cannot override the realities of contested geography. Control—or influence—over chokepoints remains a function of political alignment, local actors, and the evolving balance between state and non-state power.