Strategic Dissatisfaction as Economic Signaling: Evidence from High-Income Professionals in Iran

This study investigates strategic dissatisfaction, the possible deliberate expression of discontent used by high-income professionals as an economic and behavioral signal, within Iran’s socio-economic context. Drawing on behavioral economics, signaling theory, and social class psychology, a structured behavioral–economic questionnaire was administered to ۷۵۰ high-income professionals. To ensure methodological robustness, the dataset was randomly split into two independent subsamples (n = ۵۰۰ for Exploratory Factor Analysis; n = ۲۵۰ for Confirmatory Factor Analysis). Additionally, ordinal-response modeling was applied to address potential ceiling effects. Two latent dimensions emerged: Perceived Threat and Monopoly Protection, reflecting defensive strategies to safeguard professional positions, and Strategic Dissatisfaction and Advantage Maintenance, capturing proactive behaviors to secure personal advantages. The internal consistency of the refined survey supports its adequacy for exploratory analysis. Findings suggest that dissatisfaction may be strategically deployed, operating both defensively and proactively, while also serving symbolic functions that reinforce social legitimacy and maintain elite advantages within the sampled Iranian respondents. These results contribute to the literature on behavioral economics and signaling by demonstrating how emotional expressions can function as rational strategies to navigate professional hierarchies, competitive environments, and social legitimacy.

کلیدواژه ها:

affective economics ، Bounded Rationality ، fairness and competition ، professional monopoly ، Signaling Theory ، Strategic dissatisfaction