Investigation of the Effect of Board Compensation and CEO Power on Firms’ Innovation with the Moderating Role of Ownership Structure

سال انتشار: 1404
نوع سند: مقاله ژورنالی
زبان: انگلیسی
مشاهده: 38

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شناسه ملی سند علمی:

JR_JAAA-2-3_002

تاریخ نمایه سازی: 21 تیر 1404

چکیده مقاله:

The present study examines the effect of board compensation and CEO power on Firms’ innovation with the moderating role of ownership structure based on data envelopment analysis. The statistical population of the study includes all companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange, which after sampling amounted to ۱۴۳ companies and over a ۱۰-year period from ۲۰۱۲ to ۲۰۲۱. The hypothesis testing method in the present study was the use of multiple ordinary regression using R software. The results of the study show that there is a significant relationship between board compensation and firms’ innovation. There is also a significant relationship between CEO power and firms’ innovation. Ownership structure does not moderate the relationship between board compensation and firms’ innovation, and finally, ownership structure does not moderate the relationship between CEO power and firms’ innovation.The present study examines the effect of board compensation and CEO power on Firms’ innovation with the moderating role of ownership structure based on data envelopment analysis. The statistical population of the study includes all companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange, which after sampling amounted to ۱۴۳ companies and over a ۱۰-year period from ۲۰۱۲ to ۲۰۲۱. The hypothesis testing method in the present study was the use of multiple ordinary regression using R software. The results of the study show that there is a significant relationship between board compensation and firms’ innovation. There is also a significant relationship between CEO power and firms’ innovation. Ownership structure does not moderate the relationship between board compensation and firms’ innovation, and finally, ownership structure does not moderate the relationship between CEO power and firms’ innovation.

نویسندگان

Amir Ghafourian Shagerdi *

Department of Administrative Sciences, Imam Reza International University, Mashhad, Iran.

Leila Cheragh Sahar

Department of Administrative Sciences, Imam Reza International University, Mashhad, Iran.

Seyyed Kazem Ebrahimi

Department of Economics, Management and Administrative Sciences, Semnan University, Semnan, Iran.