“It’s a Human Thing. You Wouldn’t Understand”: Computing Machinery and Affective Intelligence

The strong thesis of artificial intelligence, aka strong AI, is that the mechanical powers of digital computing systems or digital technology more generally, can equal or exceed the achievements of rational human mindedness or human intelligence. In a recent book, Digital Technology for Humans, I’ve argued that not only is it not the case that The Turing Test is a sufficient condition for having rational human mindedness or human intelligence, but also that the very idea of artificial intelligence itself is nothing but a myth, since all digital computing systems, and all digital technology more generally, cannot, not even in principle, be intelligent in the sense in which rational human minded animals are intelligent, even when we also fully allow for our finitude, fallibility, and thoroughgoing normative imperfection. In this essay, however, I want to argue more specifically that our essentially embodied innate mental capacity for affective intelligence necessarily transcends the mechanical powers of any and all actual or really possible digital computing systems or digital technology more generally, even when we also fully allow for our finitude, fallibility, and thoroughgoing normative imperfection. By “affective intelligence,” I mean intelligence that flows from our essentially embodied innate mental capacity for caring (i.e., desiring, emoting, and feeling).

کلیدواژه ها:

Artificial intelligence ، AI ، Digital technology ، Turing Test ، Affective intelligence ، Immanuel Kant ، Authenticity