From the Rational Requirement and Ontological Reconstitution of Human Agency to More Onerous Duties

This paper aims to show that the rational obligation to utilize AI (the first thesis), combined with the transformation of the agent’s practical identity (the second thesis), can predictably prepare the ground for more numerous, burdensome, or complex rational or moral duties. This is because rational or moral obligations are dependent on the agent’s practical identity, as well as their epistemic and intentional status. When these states are elevated or enhanced, the agent’s duties naturally become more extensive or demanding. Initially, two categories of questions—normative and descriptive—are distinguished from one another. The second part of this paper pursues the thesis that if certain AI systems can merit the trust of a rational agent within specified domains, the human agent is not merely rationally permitted to employ AI, but in a range of significant choices and decisions, rationally required to do so. In the third part, we explain that on the one hand, artificial intelligence is not a merely neutral instrument for antecedently given human ends; on the other, human agency is neither dissolved nor reducible to AI agency. Rather, in long-term human–AI interaction, the conditions under which human beings perceive, deliberate, will, and understand themselves undergo a fundamental reconfiguration.

کلیدواژه ها:

Onerous Duties ، Rational Requirement ، Ontological Reconstitution ، Zetetic Norms ، Practical Identity