Post-Quantum Migration in EVM-Style Blockchain Accounts: A Taxonomy and Comparative Security Analysis

Quantum-capable adversaries would turn the classical signing key of an Ethereum externally owned account from an authentication secret into a forgeable credential. This paper asks which migration strategy best balances post-quantum security, backward compatibility, address preservation, and deployment feasibility in Ethereum Virtual Machine ecosystems. We conduct a targeted technical review of ۴۶ academic, standards, protocol, documentation, and implementation sources; define a three-level taxonomy containing ۱۴ account-, signature-, and protocol-level strategies; and evaluate each strategy through an authority-path threat model. We then apply a reproducible size-only model using standardized ECDSA, ML-DSA-۴۴, and SLH-DSA-SHA۲-۱۲۸s parameters. The analysis finds that verifier availability is not equivalent to secure migration: additive hybrid signatures, reversible delegation, optional registries, and precompiles remain Partial PQ or No PQ while an independently valid ECDSA path survives. A new or converted smart account can be Full PQ only when its complete control graph—including upgrades, recovery, permits, and cross-chain bindings—is post-quantum. Address-preserving EOA migration requires irreversible legacy rejection and closure of application-layer authority. Under the stated model, a pre-registered ML-DSA-۴۴ transaction is ۲,۴۶۵ bytes, ۲۲.۴۱ times the ۱۱۰-byte ECDSA control, whereas SLH-DSA-SHA۲-۱۲۸s reaches ۷,۹۰۱ bytes, or ۷۱.۸۳ times the control. No strategy dominates every scenario. Near-term deployment favors PQ-only smart accounts; durable EOA protection requires a protocol cutoff designed together with wallet and application migration.

کلیدواژه ها:

post-quantum cryptography ، Ethereum ، account migration ، account abstraction ، digital signatures ، EVM