Cyberattack Detection and Mitigation of False Data Injection in Grid-Connected PV Inverters Using Residual-Based Monitoring and PV-Side Recovery

The increasing connectivity of photovoltaic (PV) systems and their associated control infrastructures creates new opportunities for cyberattacks that can directly affect inverter operation. This paper investigates a false data injection attack (FDIA) targeting the DC-link voltage measurement of a grid-connected PV inverter. A ۲۵۰-kW grid-connected PV system implemented in MATLAB/Simulink is considered to examine the effect of the attack on the inverter control response and power conversion performance. A residual-based detection mechanism is developed to identify abnormal changes in the measured DC-link voltage. The residual is monitored against a predefined threshold, and an alarm is generated when the deviation exceeds the threshold. A detection delay is also incorporated into the protection logic to account for the finite time required to activate the recovery action after an attack is detected. Following detection, a PV-side measurement-based recovery mechanism is used to reconstruct the affected voltage signal and provide the inverter controller with a replacement value. The system is evaluated under normal, attack, and recovery conditions. Under the attack scenario, Vac_mean decreases from ۴۸۱.۶ V to ۳۳۴.۶ V, while Pac decreases from ۲۴۱.۵ kW to ۱۷۷.۱ kW and Ia_ref reaches ۱.۵ pu. After the recovery action, Vde_mean returns to approximately ۴۸۱ V, Pac is restored to ۲۴۱.۵ kW, and Ia ref decreases to ۰.۹۵۰۱ pu. The results demonstrate that the considered detection and recovery strategy can effectively reduce the impact of the investigated FDIA on PV inverter operation.

کلیدواژه ها:

PV systems ، Cyber-attack ، False data injection attack (FDIA) ، Grid-connected PV inverter ، Residual-based detection