Nuclear Deterrence in Iran–Zionist Entity Relations

The main aim of this research is to examine the stabilizing or destabilizing effects of nuclear weapons on international peace and security by focusing on the concept of nuclear deterrence and its underlying assumptions, and by typologizing the behavior of nuclear-armed states and analyzing their propensity for aggression or self-control. Accordingly, the main research question is: do nuclear weapons deter conflicts by making states feel more secure, or do they trigger more conflicts by enabling states to take greater risks in interstate disputes? In other words, what effect do nuclear weapons and their related capabilities have on the tendency of states possessing these weapons to seek war against their rivals? In response to this question, the hypothesis of this research is that nuclear weapons are not inherently instruments of aggression or conflict deterrents, but rather the meaning given to these weapons by leaders is what matters most. Therefore, in assessing the nature of the stabilizing or destabilizing effects of nuclear weapons, one must simultaneously pay attention to two semantic factors: the risk-taking or "zero-risk" tolerance of decision-makers in the face of a crisis, as well as the importance of the credibility and reputation of the nuclear-weapon state. Thus, the deterrent power of nuclear weapons, whether through nuclear balance or nuclear superiority, is influenced by these two semantic factors. This research is qualitative and explanatory, and in the data analysis section, the case study method will be employed, focusing on how Zionist entity, as a nuclear state, deals with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

کلیدواژه ها:

Iran ، Zionist entity ، Deterrence ، Nuclear Weapons ، security dilemma