Quantitative Assessment of Coordinated Cyber-Attacks on Optical Ground Wire (OPGW) Communication Networks and Its Cascading Effects on Power System Reliability
سال انتشار: 1405
نوع سند: مقاله کنفرانسی
زبان: فارسی
مشاهده: 45
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شناسه ملی سند علمی:
CELCONF07_052
تاریخ نمایه سازی: 11 شهریور 1405
چکیده مقاله:
Modern power systems have evolved into Cyber-Physical Power Systems (CPPS) where the physical infrastructure and communication networks are deeply interdependent. The Optical Ground Wire (OPGW) serves as a critical dual-function component, acting both as a grounding conductor and as the optical fiber backbone for data transmission in high-voltage transmission lines. This interdependence, while enabling advanced monitoring and control capabilities, introduces significant cybersecurity vulnerabilities that can be exploited through coordinated cyber-physical attacks. This paper presents a quantitative assessment framework for evaluating the impact of coordinated cyber-attacks on OPGW-based communication networks and their cascading effects on power system reliability. The proposed approach models the IEEE ۳۰-bus power system alongside its corresponding OPGW communication network topology, capturing both topological and functional interdependencies. Three attack scenarios are defined and simulated: (۱) removal of critical communication links, (۲) coordinated cyber-physical attacks, and (۳) severe multi-link failures. Communication network metrics including average path length, network diameter, and node degree distribution are analyzed alongside power system metrics such as load shedding and voltage violations. Simulation results demonstrate that removing five critical OPGW links increases the average communication path length by ۴۱.۹% and network diameter from ۷ to ۱۱ hops. Furthermore, coordinated cyber-physical attacks result in load shedding of up to ۱۸.۲۴ MW, representing ۶.۴۴% of the total system load. The analysis also reveals that the OPGW network exhibits remarkable redundancy, as the removal of up to five critical links does not disconnect the network. The findings highlight the importance of considering cyber-physical interdependencies in power system reliability assessment and provide valuable insights for designing resilient communication infrastructure against coordinated attacks
کلیدواژه ها:
Cyber-Physical Power Systems (CPPS) ، Optical Ground Wire (OPGW) ، Coordinated Cyber-Attacks ، Power System Reliability ، Communication Networks
نویسندگان
Amirabbas Homayouni
Zanjan Regional Electric Company ZANJAN, IR.IRAN