The Inaction of the United Nations in the War Against Iran and the Historical Shift from Rules to Bilateral Agreements

The international system that emerged after the Second World War was founded upon a rule-based and ‎institutional framework in which the United Nations and the Security Council were positioned at the core as ‎guarantors of collective peace and security. Although this order consistently operated under the shadow of power ‎politics, it nevertheless provided, for decades, a shared framework for restraining the use of force and regulating ‎state behavior. Developments over the past two decades, however, indicate that this legal shield has gradually ‎eroded, giving way to an ambiguous, interpretive, and power-centered order, one in which rules are less binding ‎norms than instruments contingent upon the will and interests of dominant powers.‎By examining the conceptual transition from treaty-based international law to a so-called “rules-based ‎international order,” and by analyzing the structural inefficiencies of the Security Council, this article ‎demonstrates how traditional multilateral diplomacy has lost its deterrent capacity in addressing contemporary ‎security crises, particularly in the Middle East. Israel’s attack on Iranian territory and the Security Council’s ‎inaction in response serve as a concrete test case that exposes this institutional erosion and highlights the ‎limitations of relying exclusively on international legal mechanisms. The article ultimately argues that within ‎such an order, national security and state interests have become increasingly dependent on bilateral diplomacy and ‎contractual network-building; in the absence of such infrastructure, Iran faces the risk of deepening structural ‎isolation within the international system.‎

کلیدواژه ها:

United Nations ، Rules-Based International Order ، Bilateral Diplomacy ، Israel–Iran Conflict ، ‎Structural Isolation