A Defense of the Objective Artificial Intelligence Ethics

Background and Aim: Recent years have seen in science-engaged philosophy - and overlapping parts of analytic metaphysics, applied ethics, artificial intelligence, cognitive science, the social sciences the development of some agreement about the moral study of artificial intelligence. The moral status of AIs as genuine targets of moral concern, or not, despite its prominence in the popular imagination (and science fiction) has received surprisingly little good philosophical treatment. A number of philosophers have worried about how we should reasonably think that AIs are morally considerable. For example, Schwitzgebel and Garza (۲۰۱۵) have argued that some human-grade AIs who deserve a degree of moral consideration similar to that of human beings are possible. I shall first outline the worries. The artificial intelligence ethics or robot ethics may have various meanings and interpretations. I begin by explaining what philosophers mean by 'robot ethics' or 'AI ethics'. I discuss two subjectivistically-oriented senses in which AIs can be morally considerable. In the second part, I offer a new distinction (warm vs. cold approaches), which would be a useful way of classifying various theories about AIs' moral status. Warm approaches treat AI as possible targets of primary moral concern and cold approaches disagree. I will explain and discuss both cold and warm views by means of my new arguments, such as the 'children room' thought experiment (in the third part) and the 'original moral status' argument (in the fourth part). Such new philosophical tools will contribute to my development of a new objective understanding of AI ethics. Finally in the fifth part, I offer and defend a new objective sense. I argue that this objective sense is more comprehensive than the other two subjectivistically-oriented senses. Methods: Analytical and philosophical argumentation Results: I want to develop some ideas about artificial intelligence ethics or robot ethics, which derive from reflection on Anti-individualism and objectivity. I shall explain why objectivity would be a constitutive condition for AI ethics. Conclusion: I offer and defend a new objective sense. I argue that this objective sense is more comprehensive than the other two subjectivistically-oriented senses.

کلیدواژه ها:

Artificial Intelligence ، Ethics ، Objectivity ، Anti-individualism ، representation ، meaning