Central Bank Oversight and Investment Governance in Social Funds: A ‎New Model for Monetary Discipline

Purpose:‎This study aims to conceptualize a regulatory model in which the Central Bank plays a strategic oversight role in the ‎investment governance of Iran’s social insurance funds. The objective is to align long-term public investment with ‎national monetary discipline and economic stability.‎Design/methodology/approach:‎Using a grounded theory approach, the study draws upon ۱۵ semi-structured interviews with policymakers, ‎investment managers, and regulatory experts. Data were analyzed through open, axial, and selective coding to ‎identify core institutional themes.‎Findings:‎The analysis reveals four governance failures: lack of strategic coherence, institutional fragmentation, conflicts of ‎interest, and ineffective oversight. These failures threaten both the financial sustainability of the funds and ‎macroeconomic stability. A conceptual model is proposed that integrates central bank oversight, outcome-based ‎accountability, institutional realignment, and participatory governance mechanisms.‎Practical implications:‎The study presents actionable policy recommendations for regulatory reform, particularly the inclusion of the ‎Central Bank as a supervisory body to reduce systemic risk and enhance monetary discipline in long-term ‎investment flows.‎Originality/value:‎This paper contributes to the intersection of monetary policy and institutional investment governance. It offers a ‎novel framework that links social insurance investment with macro-prudential financial oversight.‎

کلیدواژه ها:

Monetary Discipline ، Central Bank Oversight ، Investment Governance ، Social InsuranceFunds ، Institutional Reform