The Impact of The Revolving Door Phenomenon on the Financial Performance

Due to the societal scrutiny of banks' financial performance and concerns about conflicts of interest arising from the revolving door phenomenon among senior bank managers, this study addresses a critical gap in the literature by examining the impact of the revolving door on the performance of Iran's state-owned banks. Although most studies have concentrated on developed economies, few have examined this phenomenon in developing countries with centralized banking systems, such as Iran. Using data from nine state-owned banks over ۲۰ years (۲۰۰۲–۲۰۲۱), the study incorporated a dummy variable from Athanasoglou et al. (۲۰۰۹) into the model to capture the movement of managers and board members between the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran and state-owned banks. The results revealed that none of the variables adjusted for the revolving door have a significant relationship with the dependent variable, return on assets. Thus, the revolving door phenomenon did not significantly affect bank performance in this context, suggesting that managerial transitions between the Central Bank and state-owned banks did not inherently lead to conflicts of interest. These findings called into question prevailing theoretical claims regarding the detrimental consequences of the revolving-door phenomenon and underscore the need to reassess governance frameworks within highly focused banking systems.

کلیدواژه ها:

bank managers ، Conflict of Interest ، Revolving Door Phenomenon