The Role of Will in Criminal Responsibility

The principle of responsibility is universally accepted; in fact, the entire legal system is nothing but an embodiment and organization of responsibility and its rules. The study of responsibility—particularly in its criminal dimension—is among the most intricate, significant, and challenging areas of legal scholarship. What makes criminal responsibility especially complex is the difficulty of determining its foundation, which is closely tied to the issue of will and freedom. At its core, this issue represents the essence of human moral agency and legal capacity. It is a deeply contested matter that has long preoccupied not only jurists but also philosophers and thinkers across many disciplines. We hold that responsibility constitutes the backbone of the entire legal system—it is the linchpin and the bridge that connects law to the broader fabric of social life. In this role, responsibility serves as the conduit through which philosophical and sociological doctrines permeate the criminal law in particular. The foundation of criminal responsibility is inherently and necessarily linked to the problem of human freedom and the role of individual will in the making of decisions. This inquiry is, first and foremost, a philosophical one, as it deals with the tension between determinism and free choice concepts that are foundational and profoundly debated in philosophical thought. The will, as an inner psychological phenomenon, is the process through which an individual resolves to act in a certain way. Legal and psychological scholars agree that the formation of will involves two preparatory stages followed by an executive stage. The first stage is perception, where thought is directed toward a specific matter. This is followed by deliberation, where the individual weighs and reflects upon the matter. The third stage is the formation of intent, or resolution to act. Once the will is formed, the fourth stage—execution—follows, manifesting as an external act. While the final stage involves outward behavior, the first three are internal psychological processes: two belong to cognition, and the third constitutes volition itself. This implies that will, by its very nature, is composed of multiple elements and passes through distinct phases. Accordingly, any factors that impair will can intervene at any of these stages. They may affect perception, either nullifying or distorting it; they may impair deliberation, either corrupting or obstructing it; they may compromise intent, stripping it of its rational foundation; or they may alter execution, either depriving it of its true motivations or infusing it with false or unsound ones. In this study, we aim to elucidate the concept of will and its foundational role in legal capacity and, consequently, in criminal responsibility—drawing upon established legal theories and authoritative legal sources.

کلیدواژه ها:

Criminal responsibility ، Legal philosophy ، Free will ، Determinism ، Human freedom ، Moral agency ، Legal capacity ، Will formation ، Psychological stages of will ، Philosophy of law