Conceptual Analysis of the Duality of Mind and Matter in Neuropsychoanalysis: Proposing a Framework of Critical Cognitive Perspective

Recent efforts to fuse insights from neuroscience with psychoanalytic theory have driven neuropsychoanalytic scholars to re‐examine their underlying metaphysical assumptions regarding the interplay between mental and physical phenomena. Although dual‐aspect monism currently dominates this discourse, it fails to acknowledge the enduring debate in philosophy of mind and exhibits inherent conceptual shortcomings. This paper revisits three principal positions—materialism, dual‐aspect monism, and Kantian transcendental idealism—as possible foundations for neuropsychoanalytic inquiry. In doing so, it reveals instances where dual‐aspect monism inadvertently echoes both materialist and transcendental idealist stances. The paper argues that adopting an explicitly epistemologically modest framework rooted in transcendental idealism could more accurately delineate the limits of representation in our understanding of the mind–body nexus. Clinical implications arising from these different metaphysical orientations are also discussed.

کلیدواژه ها:

Neuropsychoanalysis ، Mind ، Body Dilemma ، Dual-Aspect Monism ، Transcendental Idealism ، Materialism ، Philosophy of Mind