Elite Decision-Making Logic in Economic Policy: Bridging Political Psychology and Democratic Equality

This article examines the intricate dynamics of elite decision-making in economic policy, highlighting the intersection of political psychology and the principles of democratic equality. Economic policy formulation is often portrayed as a rational and technocratic process; however, it is increasingly evident that decision-making is deeply influenced by the cognitive frameworks, biases, and socio-political motivations of elite policymakers. This study explores how political psychology—encompassing perception, judgment, risk assessment, and ideological predispositions—shapes the priorities and strategies of economic elites, while simultaneously considering the normative imperatives of democratic accountability and equality. Through a synthesis of empirical studies, theoretical analyses, and comparative case examples, the paper identifies recurring patterns in elite reasoning that impact fiscal policy, regulatory frameworks, and social redistribution mechanisms. The research argues that elite decision-making does not merely reflect objective economic imperatives but is mediated by psychological heuristics, social identity concerns, and inter-elite competition. Importantly, this mediation often produces tension between technocratic efficiency and democratic ideals, raising questions about legitimacy, transparency, and equity in economic governance. The study further investigates mechanisms through which democratic institutions can mitigate cognitive biases and align elite decisions more closely with societal welfare, including deliberative forums, independent oversight bodies, and participatory policy design. The findings underscore the necessity of integrating insights from political psychology into the analysis of policy-making processes, advocating for a multi-disciplinary approach that bridges behavioral science and normative democratic theory. By highlighting the psychological underpinnings of elite economic decision-making, the article contributes to both the understanding of policy outcomes and the development of strategies aimed at fostering accountability and equity in democratic systems. This research ultimately provides a nuanced framework for evaluating the interplay between elite cognition, political institutions, and societal welfare outcomes in the context of contemporary economic policy-making.

کلیدواژه ها:

Elite decision-making ، political psychology ، economic policy ، democratic equality ، cognitive bias