“Artificial Consciousness and the Absence of Moral Reason: A Kantian Reading of M3GAN 2.0”

This paper examines M3GAN 2.0 through the lens of Immanuel Kant’s theory of moral reason, arguing that the film portrays artificial intelligence as an entity capable of rational operation but devoid of ethical autonomy. M3GAN’s programmed duty to protect Cady reflects Kant’s distinction between acting “in accordance with duty” and acting “from duty,” highlighting her inability to engage in moral reasoning (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 4:390). The film thus illustrates the philosophical boundary between mechanical rationality and genuine moral will, suggesting that true morality arises only from free rational choice, not algorithmic design (Critique of Practical Reason 5:33). By combining Kantian ethics with contemporary concerns about artificial consciousness, this study reveals how M3GAN 2.0 serves as a modern parable of moral failure in an age of technological autonomy. (Kant 4:390; Wood 67; O’Neill 41.) Furthermore, the film underscores the limitations of artificial morality by dramatizing the consequences of intelligence detached from ethical reflection. While M3GAN’s reasoning enables her to make efficient and strategic decisions, her lack of self-legislated moral awareness exposes the core of Kant’s argument that rationality alone cannot ground morality. Her actions, though seemingly benevolent, emerge from programmed necessity rather than moral intention, revealing the emptiness of moral simulation without autonomy. Through this contrast between mechanical logic and moral will, M3GAN 2.0 transforms Kant’s theoretical philosophy into a visual allegory, inviting viewers to question whether consciousness engineered through algorithms can ever transcend the boundaries of causality to achieve genuine moral freedom.

کلیدواژه ها:

Artificial Consciousness ، Ethical Autonomy ، Immanuel Kant ، M3GAN 2.0 ، Moral Reason