An Examination of the Soul and Sense Perception in Aristotle, Avicenna, and Mulla Sadra, with an Emphasis on Mulla Sadra's Theoretical Rupture

This article, using a descriptive-analytical method, aims to articulate the epistemological rupture of Mulla Sadra's theory of the soul from that of the Peripatetic philosophers. We begin by critically examining the theories of the soul and sense perception in Aristotle and Avicenna, then delve into Mulla Sadra's intellectual leap on this topic. We'll demonstrate how a transformation in this theory also leads to a revolution in the theory of knowledge of the external world. In general, regarding the discussion of perceptions and knowledge, Mulla Sadra rejects all previous theories, which include: The critique of knowledge being quidditative and the theory of correspondence between knowledge and the known, The critique of knowledge being a psychic quality, The critique of the theory of abstracting the form of the external object in the mind, The critique of knowledge being a mental form and an addition. One of Mulla Sadra's unique conclusions in his theory of the soul is the power of actualization and inventiveness of the mental form. From his perspective, the soul is the agent and creator of sense and imaginative forms. Therefore, it must be stated that with this view, the relationship between forms and the soul is one of action to agent, not one of acceptance to recipient. As Mulla Sadra would assert, just as God emanates creation, we too emanate our knowledge in the form of mental images from within.

کلیدواژه ها:

Aristotle ، Avicenna ، Mulla Sadra ، soul (nafs) ، Sense Perception ، Inherent Subsistence (Qiyam-e Hululi) ، Emanative Subsistence (Qiyam-e Suduri)