Moral Luck in Contemporary Twelver Shiite Principles of Jurisprudence

The issue of moral luck is one of the interesting and influential issues in contemporary philosophy of ethics. The main question of this discussion can be expressed as follows: Do matters that are beyond the authority and control of the moral agent affect his moral standing or the extent of his worthiness for moral praise or blame? The “Principle of Control” replies negatively to this question while “Moral Luck” gives a positive one. In the first encounter with the jurisprudential tradition after Shaykh Ansari, it seems that there are two stances in this regard. Through the analytic study of this jurisprudential tradition, the authors have strived to identify, review, and explain the views presented in this intellectual tradition. The emphasis of the jurists that an involuntary act is outside the scope of duty, at least apparently, is an emphasis of the Principle of Control; however, we will see that this principle derived from the principles of jurisprudence is different from the Principle of Control raised in contemporary philosophy of ethics. On the other hand, the views of some jurists in the discussion of tajarrī, and their jurisprudence and interpretation regarding some narrations supports the acceptance of moral luck. A comparison of the collection of prevalent views in the principles of jurisprudence of contemporary Twelver Shiites leads us to the conclusion that the stance of most of them is to accept moral luck along with a particular reading that is compatible with the Principle of Control.