A Signaling Security Game Theory Model under Imperfect Information Situation Using fuzzy payoffs
سال انتشار: 1403
نوع سند: مقاله کنفرانسی
زبان: انگلیسی
مشاهده: 16
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شناسه ملی سند علمی:
ICIORS17_183
تاریخ نمایه سازی: 5 شهریور 1403
چکیده مقاله:
Due to the critical role of security and the limitation of defense resources, the optimal allocation of resources has been of interest. Therefore, modeling the relationship between attackers and defenders has been the focus of many researchers. In the real world, the information that the defenders and attackers have about each other is not usually perfect and it is in the form of conditional probability based on the signals they receive. In this paper, a game theory model between players under conditions of imperfect information is designed. Due to the uncertainty in the payoffs the problem is formulated as a bilevel programming problem with fuzzy coefficients. Using the idea of nearest interval approximation of fuzzy numbers, the problem is transformed into a bilevel programming problem with interval coefficients. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions is applied then to reduce the problem to an single-level problem. The results of the model help the players to make the optimal decision and thus obtain the highest utility
کلیدواژه ها:
نویسندگان
Hamed Dehghan
Department of industrial engineering, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran.
Hamid Bigdeli
Department of science and technology studies,AJA command and staff university, Tehran, Iran
Javad Tayyebi
Department of Industrial Engineering, Faculty of Industrial and Computer Engineering, Birjand University of Technology, Birjand, Iran