«عدم تمایز احکام اخلاقی و فقهی اسلام از حیث الزام»

In their works, a great number of Islamic thinkers have differentiated between ethical judgments and juristic judgments, while they agree on the sameness of their origin, especially in regard to the question of ‘obligation’. By inquiring into the origin of ‘obligation’ in Islamic jurisprudence and ethics as well as demonstrating the sameness of its origin, the present essay attempts to show the non-differentiation of obligation in some juristic and ethical propositions. In both ethical and juristic propositions, obligation based on innate things which can be revealed by reason, and which are established by the divine will; both the propositions can regulate the human behaviors; promote the spiritual manners; and ensure the social order and prosperity; and at the same time, both enjoy sanction. However, the sanction norms of the ethical judgments are different from those of juristic judgments. Nevertheless, there can consider the ways suggested by religious jurisprudents to be valid for fulfilling the ethical judgments as well.  

کلیدواژه ها:

الزام ، اخلاق ، اعتبار ، فطرت ، عقل