Investigating non-compliance behavior with fisheries regulations in the Persian Gulf

Non-compliance with fishing regulations by Iranian fishermen in three provinces of Khuzestan, Bushehr, and Hormozgan along the Persian Gulf was investigated. Using a questionnaire and a stratified random sample method, a total of ۵۶۶ fishermen were interviewed. The legitimacy variables (outcome and process) that can explain the observed noncompliance with zoning regulations for the shrimp fishery were examined. A Tobit econometric technique was used to estimate the violation decision by Iranian fishermen in the study area. The model was classified into two types: the basic model and the extended model. The key results indicate that one of the factors influencing fishermen to violate the regulation is the differential in the potential income between shrimp fishing zone and other areas. The results also indicate that the moral judgment variable (MCODE) and exogenous variables of probability of detection and conviction play a key role in the violation decision of fishermen. In general, the extended model using an exogenous determinant of probability of detection and conviction in the Tobit estimation technique gave better results than the enriched model using raw probabilities.  

کلیدواژه ها:

Fisheries management ، Regulation ، Legitimacy ، Persian Gulf ، Iran